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The Impact of an Insider and Short-selling on Bubble Formation in 
Experimental Financial Market 
 
 
Abstract 
This study extends the institutional design of the existing literature focusing solely on short selling by 
introducing an insider who is informed of the dividend distribution and experienced outsiders who 
gain information via trading experience. Our findings show that introducing short selling and an 
insider does reduce the bubble duration and size. At the same time, volatility is significantly reduced. 
Furthermore, the presence of the single insider reduces the large undervaluation and overall turnover 
in pure short selling treatment and generates small positive bubbles. Once the outsiders gain 
information via trading experience, there are small positive bubbles with reduced volatility.  
 
JEL: C92; D84; G10 
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1. Introduction 
Bubbles and financial crises have occurred during the history of financial development (refer to Palan 
(2013) for detailed survey). Since the framework first introduced by Smith, Suchanek and Williams 
(1988) (henceforth SSW, 1988), a large number of asset market experiments in the existing literature 
(for example, Lei, Noussair, and Plott, 2001; Dufwenberg, et al., 2005; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; 
Haruvy, et al., 2007) consistently show bubbles in many different environments. However, despite 
some recent efforts, there is still room for further research regarding to the design of an institution 
that eliminates deviations from fundamental values (FV)2 in experimental asset market (Ackert, et 
al., 2006). Our study tests the simultaneous influence of an insider and the possibility of short selling 
on speculative bubbles in experimental asset markets. 
 
There is mixed empirical evidence on whether insider transactions produce more informative security 
prices and enhance market efficiency. Corporate insiders, e.g., executives, are able obtain significant 
abnormal returns by using their superior information about their firm value (Gider and Westheide, 
2016). Literature suggest that restriction on insider trading reduces information asymmetry and 
enhances liquidity, which allows more informed risk arbitrage hence improves the information 
efficiency of prices (Bushman et al., 2005; Aussenegg, et al., 2017). Similarly, some experimental 
studies create a “soft” form of insider by providing some participants with the knowledge of the paid 
 
2 Abbreviation list: fundamental values (FV); Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) (SSW, 1988); the QL6-treatment 
in Haruvy and Noussair (2006) (HN-QL6); Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU); no-short-selling, (SSW); (short 
selling and insider, (SSI)); experimental currency units (ECU) 
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dividend in the current and/or following period, they show that markets with asymmetrically 
informed traders have smaller and short-lived bubbles than markets with symmetrically informed or 
uninformed traders (Oechssler, et al., 2011; Sutter, et al., 2012). 
 
Another strand of literature (for example, Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Füllbrunn and Neugebauer, 
2012; Fellner and Theissen, 2014; Chiang et al., 2017) show that short-selling constraints can reduce 
asset prices and liquidity but increase their volatilities. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) argue that this 
happens because short-selling constraints have a significant impact on informed investors, which 
reduces the informative value of prices. This in turn increases the amount of risk burden on 
uninformed investors, who would ask for lower prices to compensate for this extra risk. It is well 
documented that short sellers are sophisticated traders and possess superior information, for example, 
they can identify overvalued stocks (e.g. Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011) or 
are particularly good at analysing information (Engelberg, et al., 2012). Furthermore, short sellers 
trade a considerable amount (Diether, et al., 2009). Together these features make short sellers an 
important group of “informed” market participants whose transactions may directly and significantly 
affect both uninformed outsiders and informed insiders. Particularly, in the presence of short sellers, 
insiders would fear that short sellers have access to the same information and hence compete with 
them to trade with this information advantage. Consequently, the fear of such trading competition will 
speed up the rate at which private information is released to the market (Foster and Viswanathan, 
1993), drive down the price at which insiders can sell their shares hence endanger the profitability of 
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insider sales. A study that is close to ours is Massa et al. (2015). This empirical study shows a specific 
channel through which short sellers accelerate information releasing by inducing insiders to sell more 
(shares from their existing stakes) at higher speed in order to pre-empt the potential competition from 
short sellers. Going further by differentiating various types of insiders, To et al. (2017) find that the 
executive directors use the more timely private information to beat the short sellers in trading hence 
the profitability of insider trades are only reduced for non-executive directors after short selling is 
permitted. These empirical results are important as they show that the interaction with other types of 
“informed” investors may accelerate the release of new information by insiders and significantly 
affect the way information propagates in the financial markets.  
 
However, empirically identifying and measuring bubbles are never easy tasks since FVs are difficult 
to determine in real markets. It is equally impossible to collect the different opinions on the market. 
With these challenges, experiments may be useful tools as controlled laboratory experiment asset 
markets can control both for an asset’s FV by letting the experimenter define it exogenously and by 
instructing market participants directly about the process generating the FV (Dufwenberg, et al., 
2005). The seminal study, Haruvy and Noussair (2006) has relaxed the short-selling constraints in the 
classical SSW (1988) design. Their results suggest a potential shortcoming of short selling, i.e. it may 
overcompensate for bubbles and lead to undervaluation relative to FV. Based on the results of the 
QL6-treatment in Haruvy and Noussair (2006) (henceforth HN-QL6), they argue that instead of 
inducing rational expectations, short selling simply affects the supply of and demand for the asset, 
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which is partially determined by forces rather than the relationship between current prices and FV. 
Haruvy and Noussair (2006) further explore the origins of this demand and supply for the asset by 
simulating different types of traders especially speculators. Their results suggest a lack of common 
knowledge of rationality on the part of market participants. Therefore, Haruvy and Noussair (2006) 
suggest that the institution design should facilitate the subjects’ understanding of the connection 
between the expected future dividend stream and the current value a rational trader places on the 
asset. To test this specific institutional design with laboratory experiments, built upon SSW (1988),3 
our study extends the institutional design in HN-QL6 to test an explicit economic channel through 
which short selling can (indirectly) improve the price efficiency of the economy via their influence on 
insiders. Compared to Haruvy and Noussair (2006) (especially QL6 treatment), we facilitate subjects’ 
comprehension of the connection between the expected future dividend stream and the current value a 
rational trader places on the asset in two ways: we alter their institution design by first introducing an 
insider who is informed of the dividend distribution then introducing the experienced outsiders who 
gain information via building up experience in trading.  
 
Furthermore, we can argue that if traders’ beliefs are distributed with a mean at the FV4 of the asset, 
 
3 Although relative to SSW (1988), we have changed two variables at the same time, the existence of a substantial body 
of previous experimental work (Detailed discussions refer to the introduction and results sections.) with similar 
markets permit us to compare and interpret our results within a sizable literature and to verify that our procedures 
generate similar outcomes when applied in the same environment. 
4 In this study, we refer to the FV as the expected dividends of the sum of the shares and the intrinsic value as the truly 
realised dividends. 
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the price should closely track that FV (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006). When only one subject is 
provided with the intrinsic value, we expect that this subject as an insider is able to exploit this 
information advantage so that she gains the highest profit. While based on the experiment results in 
Plott and Sunder (1982), it is impossible to distinguish the profits of the insider from those of the 
outsiders. Potentially, there could be a large gap between the insider’s profit level and that of the 
second highest profiteer. The insider should exploit her knowledge by buying undervalued assets 
(when the offered asset price is lower than the intrinsic value) or by selling overvalued assets (when 
the offered asset price is higher than the intrinsic value). Therefore, the insider is expected to focus on 
the intrinsic value instead of the average price. Furthermore, it is also expected that given her 
information advantage, the insider should be the most active participant. Hence, we also contribute to 
the literature on insider by taking a closer look on the insiders’ investment behaviour and their 
profitability relative to the outsiders when both types of subjects can sell short. 
 
Following SSW (1988), experiment studies show that bubbles tend to occur with inexperienced 
traders but not with experienced traders who have participated many times in the same type of 
market. In line with King et al. (1993) results, Dufwenberg, et al. (2005) suggest that even by having 
a small fraction (one-third) of experienced traders, bubbles are eliminated, or at least substantially 
reduced. Furthermore, prices in markets where traders have mixed experience are similar to markets 
with only twice-experienced traders. Similarly, experimental evidence suggests when uninformed 
traders accumulate experience, asymmetric information contributes to the reduction of bubbles 
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(Haruvy, et al., 2007; Sutter, et al., 2012). We also contribute to the experiment literature by 
examining whether institution design on insider trading restrictions can be offset to some extent by 
those experienced subjects in terms of bubble formation. Traders can form expectations about the 
future prices based on their experience. Experiments in the existing studies normally create 
“experienced” subjects by repeating trading in several rounds in the same environment. While in our 
study, subjects can also form expectation or gain information advantage based on their experience of 
being an insider. Therefore, we differentiate experienced subjects according to whether she is ‘an 
informed subject based on her insider experience’ or ‘an uninformed outsider becoming informed by 
accumulating trading experience’.  Therefore, unlike Dufwenberg et al. (2005), we can also test 
whether information asymmetry concentrates on a single experienced subject in each session is 
sufficient to reduce bubbles.  
 
Based on the above discussions and review of the literature, we formulate six conjectures: 
H1: Bubbles are smaller when an insider is present and the subjects have the opportunity to sell short. 
The price deviation is positive instead of negative when an insider is allowed in HN-QL6. 
H2: Outsiders trade more cautiously when there is an insider hence the turnover decreases when an 
insider is allowed in HN-QL6. 
H3: Volatility is reduced in these sessions, where there are the presence of an insider and possibility of 
short-selling. 
H4: The additional information given to the insider does not increase her profit, due to the fact that 
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prices are driven by all participants and the nature of the game. 
H5: Profits are more unequally distributed when short selling is allowed and an insider participates in 
a session. 
H6: Experienced subjects reduce the bubble formation and inequality in profit distribution. 
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the experimental designs and 
measurements, in section 3 we summarize the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Measurements 
2.1 Experimental market participants 
The data were gathered in 12 experimental sessions conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental 
Economics Research Center in Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) located in Shanghai, China. 
We are able to replicate the results by SSW (1988) in China. This allows us to examine explicitly 
whether cultural or environmental differences have impact on subjects’ behaviour. Our Chinese 
assistants in SJTU invited subjects through an online forum via the university intranet. All subjects 
participated were undergraduate or graduate economics students at SJTU with no experience and 
knowledge of asset market experiments. Nine subjects participated in each session. Each session 
lasted for 15 periods therefore the total number of subjects participating in this experiment was 108. 
Each participant was paid a show-up fee of RMB5 (about US$ 0.79) plus their earnings in the 
experiment. Negative earnings are possible but are capped to zero in the payoffs. Participants then 
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receive initial cash and asset endowments.  
  
2.2 Timing 
Each period lasted four minutes. On average, each session lasted approximately 1 hour and 20 
minutes. All experiments have been conducted by using Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival, 
subjects were trained to use the computerized asset market for six minutes. During this practice 
period, the experimenter reads aloud the instructions, consisting of a step-by-step explanation of how 
to make bids and offers. The instructions5 have been translated into Chinese using the back 
translation procedure described in Brislin (1970). During the rest of the practice period (around 5 
minutes), subjects practiced buying and selling by using the interface. All questions were answered 
and the subjects were informed that their activities during this practice period would not be counted 
towards their final earnings. After the training was completed, the remainder of the instructions, 
which described all the other aspects of the experiment, were read aloud. The 15 periods of the 
session then proceeded. Subjects were free to trade at any time, provided that they did not violate 
either the short selling or cash balance constraint in the session. 
 
2.3 Treatments 
The experiment consisted of 225 periods in total. In the first six sessions (Sessions 1 – 6, SSW 
sessions), we replicated the classical (SSW, 1988) design in which neither short selling nor an insider 
 
5 The detailed instructions are included in Appendix B. 
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was allowed. By replicating the SSW (1988) experiment in China and finding consistent results to the 
original paper, we provide robustness checks when the experiments are conducted in different 
environment. Hence, we are assured that our subject pool is internal valid and replicable for 
conducting the following two treatments. In the second six sessions (Sessions 7 – 12, SSI sessions), 
Similar to HN-QL6, we allowed for short selling up to six positions. Furthermore, an insider, who 
was provided with information of the paid dividend distribution presented in these sessions. The 
presence of an insider was common knowledge to all the subjects. In the last three sessions, (Sessions 
10 – 12, EXP sessions), we allowed the subjects to play two rounds (2x 15 periods) of games, hence 
creating “experienced” subjects in the second round. We included the first round in these sessions in 
SSI whereas we identified the second round as an independent session, EXP-sessions. Subjects were 
not informed about the second 15-period in the experiment prior each session. We announced that we 
would conduct the second 15-period after the first 15-period ended. We also informed that subjects 
would receive the total payoff for both 15-period at the end of all 30-period.  
 
2.4 Dividend information 
The dividend was drawn independently and randomly for each session in each period out of {0, 8, 28, 
60} experimental currency units (ECU) and was paid at the end of each period.6 The expected 
 
6 Unlike Sutter, et al. (2012) who fix the dividend payments, we argue that it is possible that the insider is strongly 
influenced by the intrinsic value which she knows by definition. It is part of our research question to explore how an 
insider reacts to different intrinsic values, especially to draw conclusions on how her information advantage affects the 
profit distribution. 
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dividend payment per period was 24 ECU. The fundamental value of the asset in any period t 
equalled to 24(16-p), where p was the number of the current period. At the beginning participants 
were endowed with assets and cash in three ways: Type I started with three assets and 255 ECU; Type 
II started with two assets and 585 ECU and Type III was endowed with one asset and 945 ECU. The 
insider is randomly assigned among these three types. Each subject's cash and assets were carried 
over from one period to the next, except EXP sessions where the participants' endowment after the 
first 15-period was stored and saved. At the beginning of the second 15-period the game was restarted 
with the initial configuration. The average payoff over all sessions was RMB36.7 
 
2.5 Bubble measurements  
This section explains the bubble measures adopted in this study. The existing literature has neither 
consensus on what constitutes a bubble nor the appropriate bubble measures accepted in general. 
Stöckl, et al. (2010) propose three evaluation criteria 8  and two measures (Relative Absolute 
Deviation and Relative Deviation) which fulfill these criteria. However, individual researchers may 
have different views on these criteria and measures and also each measure has different advantages. 
Therefore, in this study, we adopt several measures based on the literature as a mean of robustness 
 
7 The detailed information on average holding value and intrinsic holding value are included in Tables B1, B2, C1 and 
C2 in the Appendix. 
8 Relation between FV and price, (b) monotonicity in the difference of FV and prices and (c) independence from the 
absolute level of the FV and the number of periods.  
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check. Table 1 presents the definitions and explanations of all the measures adopted in this study. 
Haruvy and Noussair (2006) apply several bubble measures such as Total Dispersion (TD) and 
Average Bias (AB) and in Table 1 we use bold font for these bubble measures applied in Haruvy and 
Noussair (2006), based on which we can make relevant comparisons.  
Table 1 A list of measures and explanations 
Measure Definition Explanation Note 
Relative 
Absolute 
Deviation 
(RAD) 
 An appropriate measure for mispricing which is independent from the number of 
periods and on the absolute level of FV. 
RAD equals to 0.2 indicating that 
on average mean price per period 
differs 20%from the average FV. 
Relative 
Deviation (RD)  
A positive RD indicates overvaluation 
compared to , conversely for a 
negative value. 
 
Amplitude	(A) 
 
It measures the difference between the 
largest and the smallest deviations from 
FV. It refers to the magnitude of overall 
price changes and can be used as a 
(naive) measure for volatility. 
Haruvy and Noussair (2006) 
normalize the difference by FV in 
the same period while Noussair et 
al. (2001) use FV of the first period. 
Total	
Dispersion	
(TD)  
TD is defined as the sum of the absolute 
deviation of the median price in period p. 
Pp from FV. is  
As a measure of mispricing, by 
using the median, TD can avoid 
overweighting the potential 
outliners.. The higher the TD is, the 
larger are the deviations from FV. 
Average	Bias	
(AB) 
 
Similar to TD, AB is the average 
deviation of the median price from FV in 
the same period. 
A negative AB indicates on average 
negative deviations from FV, 
conversely for a positive AB. Thus, 
AB can indicate undervaluation or 
overvaluation. 
Turnover	(TO) 
 
 qp: the number of traded units in period 
p; TSU: the total stock units the 
participants hold (18 in each session) 
TO is a measure for liquidity. The 
larger the value, the higher the 
liquidity. 
Normalized	
Deviation	
(ND)  
Pip: the price of transaction i in period p, 
ExR: the exchange rate between ECUs 
and RMB (ExR = 40 in this 
experiment),fp: FV in period p 
A high ND requires (i) high trading 
volumes and (ii) price deviations 
from FV - sufficient to interpret a 
bubble. 
Boom-	and	
Bust-Duration 
Boom: the number of 
consecutive periods in which 
the median price of the 
period is higher, and 
conversely for a bus 
This measure indicates the duration of a 
bubble.  
It is a useful complement to other 
bubble measures. . 
Volatility 
 
Following Hanke, et al. (2010), we proxy 
market volatility by the average of 
absolute returns in each trading period. θ: 
each transaction; Θ: all transactions in 
period p and market j 
 
Note: 1.  is the average price in period p, N the total number of periods and the average FV. 2. Table 1 we use 
bold font for these bubble measures applied in Haruvy and Noussair (2006), based on which we can make relevant 
comparisons. 
 
 
3.   Results 
3.1 An overview of bubble formation and volatility in three treatments 
RAD  :=  
1
N Pp −FVpp∑
FV
RD  :=  
1
N Pp −FVp( )p∑
FV
FV
A  :=  max
p
Pp −FVp
FVp
"
#
$$
%
&
''−minp
Pp −FVp
FVp
"
#
$$
%
&
''
TD  :=   Median Pp −FVp
p
∑
AB  :=  
Median Pp −FVpp∑
N
TO  :=  
qpp∑
TSU
ND  :=   p∑ i∑
Pip − fp
ExR ⋅ TSU
volj,p   :=   θ=1
Θ
∑ ln Pj,p,θ − ln Pj,p,θ−1
Θ
Pp FV
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This section presents an overview and a comparison of our results for each treatment in view of 
bubble formation and volatility. Figure 1 plots the average mean price of the treatment (in thick grey 
line), the FV (the thick black line) and the mean price of individual sessions (thin grey lines). The 
positive deviations in the SSW session can be observed in almost all the individual sessions 
throughout the 15 periods. This is in line with SSW (1988) and the following literature when short 
selling and insiders are not allowed in the experiment. Table 2 presents the average bubble measures 
cross all the sessions in three treatments.9 Given the nature of experimental research, our sample 
sizes are relatively small. To conduct non-parametric tests, we adopt the two-sided Wilcoxon signed 
rank test to test the statistical significance of our results. In line with Figure1, the mean price (P) 
results show that SSW sessions on average have the largest deviations (228.44) from the mean FV 
(192). The second largest deviation is in SSI sessions (198.04). On the other hand, EXP sessions have 
negative deviations (170.08). In general, most of the bubble measures in Table 2 provide fairly 
consistent results on the differences between SSI and SSW sessions, though some results are not 
statistically significant.  
 
9 The detailed information on each session trading is included in the appendices. 
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Figure 1 Mean prices by treatments and individual sessions 
 
Table 2 Average bubble measures cross all the sessions in three treatments 
 
Session P RAD RD A TD AB TO ND Boom  Bust Volatility 
SSW  228.44 0.408 0.178 2.14 1092 41.96 5.12 11.38 8.67 3.17 15.62 
SSI  198.04 0.417 0.03 2.849 1189 6.15 13.78** 31.11* 7 6.33 8.44** 
HN-QL6 - - - 2.17 1,443.33 −78.5 28.17 39.13 3.7 10 - 
EXP 170.08 0.236 -0.107 1.01 673 -22 7.04 9.81 4 8 13.63 
Note: 1. P: Mean Price, RAD: Relative Absolute Deviation, RD: Relative Deviation, A: Amplitude, TD: Total Dispersion, 
AB: Average Bias, TO: Share Turnover, ND: Normalised Deviation, Boom: Number of consecutive periods over FV, Bust: 
Number of consecutive periods below FV, Volatility: Measure for price volatility. 2. The detailed information about each 
bubble measure refer to Table 1; 3. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 4. Bubble measures of 
all sessions are included in Table A1 in the appendix. 5. HN-QL6 row presents the mean results of same bubble 
measurements in Haruvy and Noussair (2006) in their QL6 sessions. 
For instance, although the average RAD of SSI is higher than those of SSW and EXP, there is no 
clear indication of over- or under-valuation in SSI indicated by its near-zero RD value and a relatively 
small AB value. On the other hand, SSW has a similar RAD value as SSI but a higher tendency for 
overvaluation according to its relatively higher AB value. TO of SSI is significantly higher indicating 
a higher liquidity in SSI sessions. Furthermore, ND of SSI is also much higher than those of other 
sessions. Since there is no significant differences for RAD and TD between SSW and SSI, it suggests 
that the significant difference in their ND is due to the higher trading activity in SSI. In terms of 
bubble durations, SSW has longer boom durations than those of SSI and conversely for bust duration. 
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This is in line with the literature suggesting that short sellers accelerate information releasing by 
inducing insiders to sell more at higher speed in order to pre-empt the potential competition from 
short sellers (Massa, et al., 2015). 
 
3.2 Bubble formation and volatility in the presence of an insider 
In line with our conjectures, differences emerge when we compare results in our SSI treatment to HN-
QL6 treatment, in which only short sale is allowed but no insider presents. TD is a measure of how 
much mean prices deviate from fundamentals, whereas AB is a measure of variability. If both positive 
and negative bubbles occur in a session, AB may be low, but TD would still be high. Hence, TD and 
AB together yield a clearer picture of bubble magnitude and direction (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006). 
Once an insider is allowed in HN-QL6, TD has reduced but according to AB measure, the large 
undervaluation observed in HN-QL6 has been alleviated instead there is a small but positive price 
deviation. Haruvy and Noussair (2006) suggest that short selling may overcompensate for bubbles 
and lead to undervaluation, which could be translated into a misallocation of capital. The insider 
trading reduces information asymmetry and enhances liquidity, which allows more informed risk 
arbitrage hence improves the information efficiency of prices (Bushman et al., 2005; Aussenegg, et 
al., 2017). The efficacy of short selling depends partly on the proportion of traders using different 
classes of behavioral strategies. Indeed, in line with the literature (for example, Oechssler, et al., 2011 
and Sutter, et al., 2012), SSI results show that by providing some participants with the knowledge of 
the paid dividend, small positive bubbles can still occur in markets with symmetrically informed 
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traders when short selling is allowed. The results are also supported by the Boom and Bust measures. 
Once an insider participates, the boom period increases but the bust duration decreases relative to 
those in HN-QL6. Furthermore, once insider participates in the market where short sale is allowed, 
there is a noticeable decrease in the turnover. This supports the conjecture based on Sutter, et al 
(2012) that information asymmetry could make outsiders to trade “more cautiously”.  
 
3.3 Bubble formation and volatility in the experience treatment 
In EXP sessions we can find the lowest bubble measure values, compared with SSW and SSI 
treatments. This result holds for all bubble measurements. At the same time, EXP sessions show the 
lowest boom duration and the highest bust duration among the three treatments. Nevertheless, we find 
much lower turnover/liquidity in EXP compared with SSI, for example, TO in EXP is half of that in 
SSI and ND is three times smaller than that of SSI. However, when we compare EXP to HN-QL6, the 
results show that the size of bubbles (TD) is smaller while the direction of bubble (AB) is still 
negative. Hence it suggests that the undervaluation phenomenon still exists in EXP but the negative 
bubble is smaller in EXP than that in the HN-QL6 treatment. It seems that the reduced asymmetry 
information between outsiders and the insider via experience could work to some extent like a “true” 
insider but the efficacy in reducing negative bubble is still not as effective. This is also true for 
turnover, the less information disadvantage via experience does not make overall trading as active as 
in SSI. Hence such levels of trading by experienced traders are not aggressive enough to arbitrage 
away all the mispricing in the market.  
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Figure 2 Mean volatility by treatments 
In terms of volatility, bubble volatility is statistically significantly lower (half of the size) in SSI 
compared to SSW (Figure 2), clearly indicating higher market efficiency when both short selling and 
an insider are allowed in SSI session. Interestingly, we do not find this pattern in EXP. Instead, we 
find similar levels of liquidity and volatility in EXP as in SSW.  
 
We sum up the comparisons of the treatments in view of bubble formation and volatility in sections 
3.1 to 3.3 as the following. 
Result 1: Comparisons of Bubble formation and volatility among different treatments 
SSW/SSI: Smaller bubbles are still apparent in sessions where short selling is allowed and an insider 
with the knowledge of the paid dividends is present in a session. Volatility is significantly lower in 
SSI, though liquidity is relatively higher in SSI compared to SSW. 
SSI/HN-QL6: The large undervaluation due to overcompensation observed in HN-QL6 has been 
alleviated instead there is a small but positive price deviation in SSI. The outsider trades more 
cautiously once an insider participates hence the overall turnover reduces in SSI relative to HN-QL6. 
SSW/EXP: Bubbles are much smaller in EXP, but the levels of liquidity and volatility are 
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approximately the same as those in SSW. 
SSI/EXP: Bubbles are more apparent in SSI. At the same time liquidity in SSI is higher than that in 
EXP. However, volatility in SSI is significantly lower than EXP.  
EXP/HN-QL6: The information gained by outsiders via experience can alleviate the undervaluation 
in HN-QL6 to smaller extent compared to those in SSI. This is also true for turnover, the less 
information disadvantage via experience does not make overall trading more active than that in SSI. 
 
3.4 Potential learning effects 
In order to de-puzzle the interesting pattern we find in EXP in section 3.3 and to see if there are any 
learning effects, in this section, we compare the three treatments based on different phases of a 
market. It is possible that bubbles occur at different stages of the 15 periods. To examine any potential 
dynamic patterns in bubble formation in the treatments, we divide each session into three phases, 
each of which has five periods. Table 3 and Figure 3 present the same bubble measures as in Table 2 
and Figure 1 but for each phase cross all the sessions. 
 
3.4.1 Bubble formation and volatility in Phase 1 – Periods 1-5 
In terms of bubble sizes, results in Figure 3 and Tables 3 (considering RD and AB) suggest that there 
is a relatively small tendency of undervaluation in SSW but a much larger undervaluation tendencies 
in SSI and EXP treatments, though the differences are not statistically significant.  Similar to results 
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in section 3.1, liquidity (see TO and ND) is significantly higher in SSI than in other treatments. 
Although there is no significant difference in bubble volatility, bubble volatility is the lowest in SSI 
among the three treatments. Compared with HN-QL6, most of the SSI results of phase 1 are 
consistent with section 3.2 except that there is even larger undervaluation in SSI (based on AB) than 
in HN-QL6. On the other hand, the results of EXP in phase 1 are consistent with section 3.3 
 
Figure 3: Mean prices in all treatments by phases. 
Note: Phase 1: periods 1-5; Phase 2: periods 6-10; Phase 3: periods 11-15 
 
Table 3 Bubble measures for treatments over three phases 
Note: 1. The detailed information about each bubble measure refer to Table 1; 2.*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%; 3. The results show that volatility is lower in all phases in SSI and in all phases bubbles are 
smaller in EXP. 
 
Session P RAD RD A TD AB TO ND Boom  Bust Volatility 
SSW Phase 1 294.17 0.25 -0.054 0.346 384 -8.75 0.35 7.29 2.5 2.5 4.67 
SSI Phase 1 226.93 0.297 -0.271 0.27 458 -82.45 5.48** 16.42* 0.83* 4.16* 3.04 
EXP Phase 1 228.51 0.279 -0.272 0.225 436 -85.03 2.74 7.26 0.66 4.32 4.16 
SSW Phase 2 295.4 0.601 0.474 1.37 511 102.27 1.15 2.59 4 2.5 5.32 
SSI Phase 2 216.41* 0.344* 0.132 0.504*** 332* 25.22* 4.56** 8.14* 2.83 2 2.08*** 
EXP Phase 2 194.55 0.126 0.04 0.308 121 17.64 1.8 0.91 2 2.66 4.68 
SSW Phase 3 102.34 0.575 0.488 1.19 197 32.35 1.19 1.5 2.83 1.33 4.89 
SSI Phase 3 150.46 1.134 1.077 1.99 399 75.28 3.74*** 8.55 4 1.22 2.87** 
EXP Phase 3 73.64 0.339 0.16 0.639 116 9.97 2.5 1.64 3 2 3.68 
Avg.SSI cross 
phases 
197.93 0.59 0.31 0.92 396.33 6.02 4.59 11.04 2.55 2.46 2.66 
Avg. EXP cross 
phases 
165.57 0.25 -0.02 0.39 224.33 -19.14 2.35 3.27 1.89 2.99 4.17 
HN-QL6    2.17 1,443.33 −78.5 28.17 39.13 3.7 10  
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3.4.2 Bubble formation and volatility in Phase 2 – Periods 6 -10 
Results of phase 2 in Table 3 are the most significant among all three phases. The bubble size in SSI 
is significantly smaller than that in SSW according to RAD and TD. Amplitude (A) measures the 
difference between the largest and the smallest deviations from FV. Results show that amplitude of 
SSI is significantly smaller than that of SSW, indicating smaller variance in prices deviations. The 
highly significant volatility results are in line with this finding. Furthermore, volatility in SSI in phase 
2 is around 32% lower than that in phase 1 in SSI. The result on liquidity is consistent with phase 1 in 
the sense that liquidity (see TO and ND) is significantly higher in SSI than other treatments. In terms 
of bubble duration, SSI has significantly shorter boom duration than that of SSW but significantly 
longer bust duration that that of SSW. These results are consistent with those in section 3.1. Compared 
with HN-QL6, all results of phase 2 are consistent with the comparisons made in section 3.2. 
However, the results of EXP in phase 2 has a noticeable change relative to HN-QL6 in the sense that 
the undervaluation in HN-QL6 is replaced by a small positive bubble in EXP. 
 
3.4.3 Bubble formation and volatility in Phase 3 – Periods 11-15 
In terms of bubble size, most of the measures suggest that phase 3 has large bubbles especially in SSI 
mostly due to overvaluation, though the results are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we 
cannot conclude that bubbles in SSI are larger than those in SSW in phase 3. According to Haruvy 
and Noussair (2006), mean price tends to stay almost constant for a long period. This pattern does not 
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emerge as strongly in sessions where short selling is not allowed. According to the individual session 
plot of mean price in SSI (Figure A2 in the appendix), the high aggregate value is driven by the 
results of session SSI1 and SSI4. This result is not surprising since the FV is declining but mean 
prices stay almost constant. In terms of liquidity and volatility, the results are consistent with the last 
two phases. Compared with HN-QL6, all the results of phase 3 are consistent with the comparisons 
made in section 3.2. Consistent with the results of EXP in phase 2, the undervaluation in HN-QL6 is 
still replaced by a small positive bubble in EXP. It seems that the outsiders do learn and become more 
experienced in the later phases, during which they become more effective in eliminating negative 
bubbles and even start creating positive bubbles relative to the first phase. 
 
We sum up the discussions in section 3.4 as the following. 
Result 2: Comparisons of Bubble formation and volatility based on segmentation of the sessions in 
three phases  
SSW/SSI: Bubbles are significantly smaller in SSI. Liquidity in SSI in all phases is significantly 
higher. Volatility is lower in all phases in SSI but significantly different especially in later phases. 
Hence the interaction with other types of “informed” investors does enhance the propagation of new 
information by insiders and significantly affect the market efficiency especially at later phases once 
they have learned.   
SSI/HN-QL6: The results of three phases on average are highly consistent with the results of 
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different sessions in section 3.2. The large undervaluation observed in HN-QL6 is replaced by a small 
overvaluation in SSI. The outsiders trade more cautiously once an insider participates hence the 
overall turnover decreases in SSI relative to HN-QL6. 
SSW/EXP: Bubbles are smaller in EXP in all phases. EXP session has higher liquidity than SSW in 
all phases despite trading activity increases over the three phases gradually in SSW. It seems that the 
reduced information asymmetry between outsiders and the insider via experience could also work to 
some extent like a “true” insider and contribute to the improvement of market efficiency. In all 
phases, volatility in EXP is slightly higher compared to that in SSW. 
SSI/EXP: In all phases, bubbles are much smaller in EXP. Consistent with results in section 3.3, EXP 
has lower liquidity but higher volatility than SSI.  
EXP/HN-QL6: It seems that the outsiders do learn and become more experienced in the later phases, 
during which they become more effective in eliminating negative bubbles and even creating positive 
bubbles relative to the first phase. 
 
3.5 The Insider’s behaviour and her profitability 
In this section, we focus on the insider’s behaviour and her profitability. Figure 4 shows that the 
insider only obtains the highest profit in SSI4 among all the participants in the session. In the 
presence of short sellers, insiders would fear that short sellers have access to the same information 
and hence compete with them to trade with this information advantage. Consequently, the fear of 
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such trading competition could drive down the price at which insiders can sell their shares hence 
endanger the profitability of insider sales (Foster and Viswanathan, 1993). The profit distribution 
crosses all the participants vary considerably. For instance, the highest profit is 1.7 times higher than 
the second highest one (session SSI3) while the highest profit (belongs to the insider) is 2.6 times 
larger than the second highest profit (SSI4).10 However, the insider gains the lowest profit in EXP1 
and EXP3. In line with our expectation, experience can contribute to the alleviation of information 
asymmetry and hence profit inequality between the insider and the outsiders (Haruvy, et al., 2007; 
Sutter, et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 4 Profits of all participants in all sessions 
Note: The figure shows that the profit distributions of all the participants vary considerably. The insider’s profit is marked 
in bold. 
Although the insider is not always able to obtain the highest profit, in line with our conjecture, she is 
the almost always the most active seller as illustrated in Figure 5. The results lend support to the 
empirical findings in Massa et al. (2015). It shows that the presence of the short seller could induce 
insiders to sell more and faster to pre-empt the potential competition from short sellers. The finding is 
important as it shows that the interaction with other types of “informed” investors may enhance the 
propagation of new information by insiders and significantly affect the financial markets efficiency. 
 
10 Table A2 in the appendix shows the detailed profit distributions of each session. 
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For instance, in SSI3 and SSI4, the selling-propositions by the insider are significantly larger than 
those of the other participants. Particularly in SSI6, the selling-propositions of the insider is as large 
as those of all the other participants combined. We observe similar results in EXP sessions.  
 
Figure 5 Proposed sales by subjects in each session  
Note: The insider is always marked as the first subject in each graph. 
 
To further understand the insider's behavior, Figure 6 presents all selling and buying-propositions (in 
grey and black respectively) by differentiating the declined propositions (marked as crosses) from the 
accepted propositions (marked as dots). The intrinsic value is presented as the solid grey line and the 
average price is indicated by the solid black line. Results in Figure 6 show that the insider’s trading 
decisions are largely based on the average price instead of on the fundamental value in most of the 
sessions, especially in SSI4 and SSI5. Except for these last periods in SSI4, the insider uses the 
average price as the reference point since selling prices and selling-propositions are centred on the 
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average price instead of on the intrinsic value. In SSI4, she is almost always willing to buy assets a 
little lower than their average prices but considerably larger than their intrinsic value except for the 
last periods, where she tries to buy excessively below the intrinsic value. In SSI1, the insider sells 
assets at the price around 100 ECU lower than their current intrinsic value but also buys assets at the 
prices that are lower than their intrinsic value. This is also observed in SSI 6 where the intrinsic value 
seems to be irrelevant for the insider’s trading decisions. These patterns are still apparent in all the 
EXP sessions.  
 
Furthermore, we investigate whether and how the profit is distributed unequally between the insider 
and the rest of the participants. Although the insider did not always obtain the largest profit, we 
observe obvious inequality in the absolute term. For example, the insider earns 2250 ECU more profit 
than the second highest profit in SSI4 (Table A2 in the appendix). Such inequality is even more 
noticeable when we take into account the low dividend distributed in all sessions of this experiment. 
To measure the inequality of profit distribution more formally, we use the Gini-coefficient and the 
Lorenz curve11. A zero Gini-coefficient value indicates equally distributed profits while the closer it 
is to one, the more unequally distributed they are. According to the mean Gini-coefficient of each 
 
11 The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the distribution of income, where it shows for the bottom x% of 
households, what percentage (y%) of the total income they have.  In the case of perfectly equal income distribution 
the bottom N% of society would always have N% of the income. This can be represented by the straight line y = x; 
called the "line of perfect equality." While in the case of a perfectly unequal distribution, the curve would be at y = 
0% for all x < 100%, and y = 100% when x = 100%. This curve is called the "line of perfect inequality." The Gini 
coefficient is the ratio of the area between the line of perfect equality and the observed Lorenz curve to the area 
between the line of perfect equality and the line of perfect inequality. The higher the coefficient, the more unequal 
the distribution is. 
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treatment (Table 4), profits are distributed more equally in SSW since SSW has the lowest mean 
Gini-coefficient among all the treatments. While when information asymmetry concentrates on a 
single insider (SSI), the profit distributions turns much more unequal as expected. However, in most 
of the EXP sessions, once the outsiders build up experience hence reduce their information 
asymmetry relative to the insider, it helps to alleviate the inequality in profit distributions.  Figure 7 
plots the Lorenz curve of individual session and they provide a consistent conclusion. 
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Figure 6 (sales) An insider behavior in SSI-sessions 
Note: The intrinsic value is given as the solid grey line, the black line is the average price. Sale-propositions are coloured 
in grey, buying-propositions are coloured in black. Accepted propositions are marked as dots, rejected propositions are 
marked as crosses. Results show that the insider uses the average price instead of intrinsic value as the reference point. 
Table 4 The mean Gini coefficient of each treatment 
Session Gini 
SSW 0.191 
SSI 0.427*** 
EXP 0.347 
Note: 1. The statistical significance is based on the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 2. *** significant at 1% 
 
We sum up the results in section 3.5 as the following. 
Result 3: The insider’s behaviour and her profitability   
Profitability: The insider does not always earn the largest profit among all the participants in the 
sessions she takes part in. 
Selling: The insider is almost always the most active seller among all the participants. In both SSI 
and EXP sessions, the insider bases her investment decision mostly on the average price instead of on 
the intrinsic value. 
Profit distribution: When an insider knows the intrinsic value and subjects are able to sell short, 
profits are more unequally distributed compared to a market where neither any insider nor short 
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
EXP 1
Trade
Pr
ice
, I
V
0 20 40 60 80
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
EXP 2
Trade
Pr
ice
, I
V
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
10
0
30
0
50
0
EXP 3
Trade
Pr
ice
, I
V
  29 
selling is allowed. However, when other participants reduce their information asymmetry relative to 
the insider via trading experience, it helps to alleviate the inequality in profit distributions in EXP. 
 
 Figure 7 Lorenz curves of profit distributions in all sessions 
 
4.   Conclusion  
Built upon classic SSW (1988) setting, our study extends the institutional design in HN-QL6 to test 
an explicit economic channel through which short selling can (indirectly) improve the price efficiency 
of the economy via their influence on insiders. Our experiment designs facilitate subjects’ 
comprehension of the connection between the expected future dividend stream and the current value a 
rational trader places on the asset by first introducing an insider and then introducing the experienced 
outsiders. Our results suggest that the presence of the single insider does reduce the large 
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undervaluation in pure short selling treatment in HN-QL6 and generates small positive bubbles. 
Furthermore, once the uninformed outsiders become informed by building up experience in trading, 
their trading can alleviate the undervaluation in HN-QL6 with even smaller positive bubbles than 
those sessions without experienced subjects. It suggests that institution design on insider trading 
restrictions can be offset to some extent by those experienced subjects in terms of bubble formation. 
In the presence of an insider, the overall turnover is smaller compared to HN-QL6 because outsiders 
trade even more cautiously facing information asymmetry. Furthermore, the reduced information 
asymmetry between outsiders and the insider via experience makes volatility significantly smaller. 
These results provide support to the literature by showing that the interaction with other types of 
“informed” investors can accelerate the release of new information by insiders and significantly affect 
the financial market efficiency. 
 
In line with the literature (Plott and Sunder, 1982; Massa, et al., 2015), with the presence of short 
sellers, the insider is a very active trader and almost always the most active seller. However, the 
insider does not always gain the highest profit among the subjects even though profits are more 
unequally distributed in SSI. In the presence of short sellers, insiders fear for potential trading 
competitions from short sellers, who may have similar information advantage. Therefore, the insider 
trades faster in order to pre-empt such competition but such fear could also drive down the price at 
which insiders can sell their shares hence endanger the profitability of insider sales. Contrary to the 
expectation, the insider’s trading decision is mostly influenced by the average prices rather than by 
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the intrinsic value due to the nature of the game.  
 
Overall our results show institutional arrangement can have important influences on bubbles. The 
effectiveness of short selling can be affected by the level of information asymmetry among the traders 
hence their behavioral strategies. Therefore, financial authorities concern on financial bubbles need to 
take both short selling and insider efficacies into account for their net impacts. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Table A1 Bubble measures in all sessions 
Session P RAD RD A TD AB TO ND Boom Bust Volatility Gini 
SSW1 225.9 0.255 0.166 2.159 620 34.87 4.44 3.52 10 3 17.96 0.187 
SSW2 282.71 0.593 0.443 2.147 1577 104.37 2.61 6.45 8 1 17.03 0.181 
SSW3 249.32 0.355 0.28 2.362 1003 57.13 5.11 7.76 11 2 16.04 0.191 
SSW4 162.45 0.575 -0.144 1.68 1662 -27.5 9.33 35.17 7 5 10.84 0.238 
SSW5 188.64 0.256 -0.017 1.508 436 17.43 3.39 4.68 5 4 17.6 0.136 
SSW6 261.64 0.443 0.34 2.961 1255 65.43 5.83 10.73 11 4 14.26 0.212 
Average: 228.44 0.408 0.178 2.14 1092 41.96 5.12 11.38 8.67 3.17 15.62 0.191 
SSI1 292.3 0.608 0.491 6.095 1673 97.13 16.61 51.52 12 3 5.54 0.474 
SSI2 124.06 0.359 -0.331 0.624 1003 -65.13 13.61 29.37 1 13 7.1 0.28 
SSI3 199.89 0.198 0.039 0.943 714 0.67 8.83 14.87 6 3 13.89 0.579 
SSI4 270.4 0.485 0.383 4.138 1317 81.67 7.67 17.88 11 4 12.9 0.435 
SSI5 140.35 0.49 -0.252 4.224 1432 -49.87 21.94 56.94 5 9 3.75 0.372 
SSI6 161.25 0.364 -0.15 1.07 995 -27.57 14 28.09 7 6 7.49 0.42 
Average: 198.04 0.417 0.03 2.849 1189 6.15 13.78** 33.11** 7 6.33 8.44*** 0.427*** 
EXP1 206 0.16 0.068 1.537 441 12.83 9.78 7.07 8 3 8.26 0.254 
EXP2 141.66 0.393 -0.246 1.114 1140 -51 7.56 19.25 3 7 13 0.624 
EXP3 162.58 0.154 -0.144 0.381 438 -29.07 3.78 3.1 1 14 19.62 0.163 
Average: 170.08 0.236 -0.107 1.01 673 -22 7.04 9.81 4 8 13.63 0.347 
Subject SSW1 SSW2 SSW3 SSW4 SSW5 SSW6 SSI1 SSI2 SSI3 SSI4 SSI5 SSI6 EXP1 EXP2 EXP3 
1 839 2061 1323 961 1960 1660 2209 1631 3599 3615 1697 966 545 2765 533 
2 961 1167 1958 1461 1242 1453 2910 1261 2751 943 32 3072 902 -439 1070 
3 1506 1104 1354 544 843 1137 43 1187 395 1365 838 3040 1302 446 753 
4 1140 1906 970 2347 1280 1295 153 615 1031 283 153 2843 2007 1304 987 
5 1492 1552 2150 1006 1260 1840 2673 1357 3988 736 2265 -249 876 -269 1223 
6 710 1482 1488 1267 1066 212 216 -392 -899 796 1589 1524 2509 2606 1167 
7 2033 1564 845 954 1603 663 280 1886 5995 224 2190 2579 2061 3857 1639 
8 878 509 2653 1549 1545 1531 1022 1697 3112 769 592 935 2801 -474 1549 
9 1610 1048 1452 2448 1810 1234 2815 1351 -715 422 2317 8 1838 3269 1168 
Table A2 Profits of all participants in all sessions 
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Figure A1: Mean prices in SSW-sessions 
 
FigureA2: Mean price in SSI-sessions 
   
 
FigureA3: Mean prices in EXP 
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Appendix B 
Instructions for experiment (SSI) 
1. General Instructions 
Welcome!  
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them 
carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment.  
The experiment will consist of a sequence of trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a 
market. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you 
might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.  
The currency used in the market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the 
experiment will be in RMB. The conversion rate is 40 francs to 1 yuan. In addition to any profits you earn in the market, 
you will also receive an additional ￥5 (equivalent to 200 francs) for your participation today. 
2. How to use the computerized market  
The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. On the left-most column of your computer screen, 
in top left corner, you can see the Money you have available to buy Shares and in the middle of the column, you see the 
number of Shares you currently have. 
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter ask price” in the second column.  In that text 
area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share, and then select “Submit Ask Price”. Please do so 
now.  
You will notice that nine numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the third column from the left, 
entitled “Ask Price”. The lowest ask price will always be on the bottom of that list and will be highlighted. If you press 
“Buy”, the button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share for the lowest current ask price. You can also 
highlight one of the other prices if you wish to buy at a price other than the lowest. 
Please purchase a share now by highlighting a price and selecting “Buy”. Since each of you had put a share for sale and 
attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started out with. This is 
because you bought one share and sold one share. 
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a share your Money increases 
by the price of the sale. 
You may make an offer to purchase a unit by selecting “Submit bid price.”  
Please do so now. Type a number in the text area “Enter bid price.” Then press the red button labeled “Submit Bid Price”.  
You can sell to the person who submitted an offer if you highlight the offer, and select “Sell”. Please do so now for one of 
the offers.  
You will now have a practice period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not 
influence your position later in the experiment. The goal of the practice period is only to master the use of the interface. 
Please be sure that you have successfully submitted bid prices and ask prices. Also be sure that you have accepted both 
bid and ask prices. You are free to ask questions, by raising your hand, during the practice period. 
3. Specific Instructions for this experiment 
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will be a market open, in which you may buy and 
sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of shares carries over from one trading period to 
the next.  
Your profits come from two sources—from buying and selling shares and from collecting dividends on all shares you 
hold at the end of each period. You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 
trading periods.  
At the beginning of the experiment, before trading starts, the experimenter will run a computer program to virtually roll a 
four-sided die 15 times. The 15 numbers are to determine the dividends for 15 trading periods sequentially. Each period, 
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each share you hold at the end of the period:   
earns you a dividend of 0 francs if the die reads 1  
earns you a dividend of 8 francs if the die reads 2  
earns you a dividend of 28 francs if the die reads 3  
earns you a dividend of 60 francs if the die reads 4  
Each of the four numbers on the die is equally likely. The average dividend in each period is 24. The dividend is added to 
your cash balance automatically. 
After the dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no further earnings possible from shares. 
4. Selling more shares than you own 
It is possible to sell more shares than you own. That is, you may “own” a negative number of shares (up to - 6 shares). In 
that case, on the negative number of shares you own, you will pay the dividend on each share. For example, suppose you 
have four shares and you sell ten. You will then have -6 (negative six) shares. Then, as long as you have -6 shares, at the 
end of each period you must pay dividends on six shares. The computer program will automatically deduct the dividend 
payment from your earnings. 
5. Your Earnings 
Your earnings for the entire experiment will equal the amount of cash that you have at the end of period 15, after the last 
dividend has been paid, plus the ￥5  you receive for participating. The amount of cash you will have is equal to:  
The cash (called “money” on your screen) you have at the beginning of the experiment  
+ dividends you receive (when you have more than zero shares) 
- dividends you pay (when you have less than zero shares) 
+ money received from sales of shares 
- money spent on purchases of shares 
6. Information about Dividends  
There is either an AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE or an INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE attached to 
your instructions. The AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE illustrates the average amount of dividend and value of 
each Share you hold in inventory for each period, while the INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE gives the exact 
amount of dividend and value of each Share you hold in inventory for each period. You can use your table to help you 
make decisions. Please note that only ONE INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE is distributed among all 
participants. 
Contents in AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE: 
There are 5 columns in the table. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the 
experiment. The second column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value is 
being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until the 
end of the experiment. The fourth column, labeled Average Dividend per Period, gives the average amount that the 
dividend will be in each period for each unit held in your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Average Holding Value Per 
Unit of Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your inventory from now until the end of the experiment. 
That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will earn on average the amount 
listed in column 5.  
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend on a Share has a 25% chance of being 0, a 
25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 
24 per period for each Share. If you hold a Share for 7 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on 
average 7*24 = 168. 
Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on average 168. 
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Contents in INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE: 
There are 5 columns in the table. The first three columns are exactly the same with those of AVERAGE HOLDING 
VALUE TABLE. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the experiment. The second 
column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value is being calculated. The third 
column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until the end of the experiment. The 
fourth column, labeled Dividend per Period, gives the amount that the dividend will be in each period for each unit held in 
your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Intrinsic Holding Value Per Unit of Inventory, gives the precise value for each 
unit held in your inventory from now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for 
the remainder of the experiment, you will earn the amount listed in column 5.  
Suppose for example that there are 4 periods remaining. The dividends pay off for the last 4 periods are: 8, 0, 28 and 60 
for each Share. If you hold a Share for 4 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 4 periods is 8+0+28+60 = 96. 
Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 4 periods is 96. 
Table B1 AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE 
Ending 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Number of Holding 
Periods 
x Average Dividend 
Per Period 
= Average Holding Value 
Per Share in Inventory 
15 1 15  24  360 
15 2 14  24  336 
15 3 13  24  312 
15 4 12  24  288 
15 5 11  24  264 
15 6 10  24  240 
15 7 9  24  216 
15 8 8  24  192 
15 9 7  24  168 
15 10 6  24  144 
15 11 5  24  120 
15 12 4  24  96 
15 13 3  24  72 
15 14 2  24  48 
15 15 1  24  24 
Table B2 INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE 
Ending 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Number of 
Holding Periods 
Die 
Reading 
Dividend Per 
Period 
Intrinsic Holding Value 
Per Share in Inventory 
15 1 15 2 28 416 
15 2 14 2 28 388 
15 3 13 3 28 360 
15 4 12 2 8 332 
15 5 11 1 8 324 
15 6 10 2 28 316 
15 7 9 3 60 288 
15 8 8 2 28 228 
15 9 7 1 8 200 
15 10 6 1 8 192 
15 11 5 2 28 184 
15 12 4 4 60 156 
15 13 3 3 28 96 
15 14 2 2 8 68 
15 15 1 4 60 60 
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Appendix C 
Instructions for experiment (EXP) 
1. General Instructions 
Welcome!  
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them 
carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment.  
The experiment will consist of a sequence of trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a 
market. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you 
might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.  
The currency used in the market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the 
experiment will be in RMB. The conversion rate is 70 francs to 1 yuan. In addition to any profits you earn in the market, 
you will also receive an additional ￥5 (equivalent to 200 francs) for your participation today. 
2. How to use the computerized market  
The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. On the left-most column of your computer screen, 
in top left corner, you can see the Money you have available to buy Shares and in the middle of the column, you see the 
number of Shares you currently have. 
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter ask price” in the second column.  In that text 
area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share, and then select “Submit Ask Price”. Please do so 
now.  
You will notice that nine numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the third column from the left, 
entitled “Ask Price”. The lowest ask price will always be on the bottom of that list and will be highlighted. If you press 
“Buy”, the button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share for the lowest current ask price. You can also 
highlight one of the other prices if you wish to buy at a price other than the lowest. 
Please purchase a share now by highlighting a price and selecting “Buy”. Since each of you had put a share for sale and 
attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you started out with. This is 
because you bought one share and sold one share. 
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a share your Money increases 
by the price of the sale. 
You may make an offer to purchase a unit by selecting “Submit bid price.”  
Please do so now. Type a number in the text area “Enter bid price.” Then press the red button labeled “Submit Bid Price”.  
You can sell to the person who submitted an offer if you highlight the offer, and select “Sell”. Please do so now for one of 
the offers.  
You will now have a practice period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not 
influence your position later in the experiment. The goal of the practice period is only to master the use of the interface. 
Please be sure that you have successfully submitted bid prices and ask prices. Also be sure that you have accepted both 
bid and ask prices. You are free to ask questions, by raising your hand, during the practice period. 
3. Specific Instructions for this experiment 
The experiment will consist of two parts – Part 1 and Part 2. In each part, there will be 15 trading periods. In each period, 
there will be a market open, in which you may buy and sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and your 
inventory of shares carries over from one trading period to the next.  
Your profits come from two sources—from buying and selling shares and from collecting dividends on all shares you 
hold at the end of each period. You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 
trading periods.  
At the beginning of the experiment, before trading starts, the experimenter will run a computer program to virtually roll a 
four-sided die 15 times. The 15 numbers are to determine the dividends for 15 trading periods sequentially. Each period, 
each share you hold at the end of the period:   
earns you a dividend of 0 francs if the die reads 1  
earns you a dividend of 8 francs if the die reads 2  
earns you a dividend of 28 francs if the die reads 3  
earns you a dividend of 60 francs if the die reads 4  
Each of the four numbers on the die is equally likely. The average dividend in each period is 24. The dividend is added to 
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your cash balance automatically. 
After the dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no further earnings possible from shares. 
Following the end of Period 15 of Part 1, you will get a screen informing you of the end of Part 1. Part 2 will begin from 
period 1 with a new 15-period-lived asset.  
None of your Shares or Money from Part 1 will transfer to Part 2. Trading and dividends for Part 2 will be the same as in 
Part 1. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will consist of your earnings for Part 1 plus your earnings for Part 2.  
4. Selling more shares than you own 
It is possible to sell more shares than you own. That is, you may “own” a negative number of shares (up to - 6 shares). In 
that case, on the negative number of shares you own, you will pay the dividend on each share. For example, suppose you 
have four shares and you sell ten. You will then have -6 (negative six) shares. Then, as long as you have -6 shares, at the 
end of each period you must pay dividends on six shares. The computer program will automatically deduct the dividend 
payment from your earnings. 
5. Your Earnings 
Your earnings for the experiment will consist of the sum of your earnings for part 1 and part 2. Your earnings for the each 
of the two parts of the experiment will equal the amount of cash that you have at the end of period 15, after the last 
dividend has been paid, plus the ￥5  you receive for participating. The amount of cash you will have is equal to:  
The cash (called “money” on your screen) you have at the beginning of the experiment  
+ dividends you receive (when you have more than zero shares) 
- dividends you pay (when you have less than zero shares) 
+ money received from sales of shares 
- money spent on purchases of shares 
6. Information about Dividends  
There is either an AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE or an INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE attached to 
your instructions. The AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE illustrates the average amount of dividend and value of 
each Share you hold in inventory for each period, while the INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE gives the exact 
amount of dividend and value of each Share you hold in inventory for each period. You can use your table to help you 
make decisions. Please note that only ONE INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE is distributed among all 
participants. 
Contents in AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE: 
There are 5 columns in the table. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the 
experiment. The second column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value is 
being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until the 
end of the experiment. The fourth column, labeled Average Dividend per Period, gives the average amount that the 
dividend will be in each period for each unit held in your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Average Holding Value Per 
Unit of Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your inventory from now until the end of the experiment. 
That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will earn on average the amount 
listed in column 5.  
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend on a Share has a 25% chance of being 0, a 
25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 
24 per period for each Share. If you hold a Share for 7 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on 
average 7*24 = 168. 
Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on average 168. 
Contents in INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE: 
There are 5 columns in the table. The first three columns are exactly the same with those of AVERAGE HOLDING 
VALUE TABLE. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading period of the experiment. The second 
column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the average holding value is being calculated. The third 
column gives the number of holding periods from the period in the second column until the end of the experiment. The 
fourth column, labeled Dividend per Period, gives the amount that the dividend will be in each period for each unit held in 
your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Intrinsic Holding Value Per Unit of Inventory, gives the precise value for each 
unit held in your inventory from now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for 
the remainder of the experiment, you will earn the amount listed in column 5.  
Suppose for example that there are 4 periods remaining. The dividends pay off for the last 4 periods are: 8, 0, 28 and 60 
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for each Share. If you hold a Share for 4 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 4 periods is 8+0+28+60 = 96. 
Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 4 periods is 96. 
 
Table C2 INTRINSIC HOLDING VALUE TABLE (Sample) 
Ending 
Period 
Current 
Period 
Number of 
Holding Periods 
Die 
Reading 
Dividend Per 
Period 
Intrinsic Holding Value Per 
Share in Inventory 
15 1 15 2 28 416 
15 2 14 2 28 388 
15 3 13 3 28 360 
15 4 12 2 8 332 
15 5 11 1 8 324 
15 6 10 2 28 316 
15 7 9 3 60 288 
15 8 8 2 28 228 
15 9 7 1 8 200 
15 10 6 1 8 192 
15 11 5 2 28 184 
15 12 4 4 60 156 
15 13 3 3 28 96 
15 14 2 2 8 68 
15 15 1 4 60 60 
 
